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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH RASMUSSEN AND FAUN
RASMUSSEN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
•vs. •

No. 4218

NEAL GL DAVIS AND DORA S. DAVIS,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action against the defendants
to recover damages from the defendants on account of the
alleged false and fraudulent representation made by the
defendants to the plaintiffs in connection with a contract
wherein and whereby the plaintiffs agreed to purchase
and the defendants agreed to sell some tracts of land in
Sanpete County, Utah, with the improvements thereon,
together with some shares of water right, farming, ma-
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chinery, twelve head of cows, five calves and twenty
sheep.
In such action the plaintiffs also sought to have the
court declare null and void a provision of the contract
which in effect provided that the defendants may, upon
default in performance of any of the obligations of the
contract by the plaintiffs, rescind the contract and retain whatever had been paid thereon as liquidated damages. The basis upon which plaintiffs alleged such provision of the contract is null and void is that the same
constituted a penalty and as such is against public policy
(E. 1-18).
To the complaint the defendants filed their answer
and three counterclaims. In their answer they admitted
the execution of the contract set out in plaintiffs' complaint, but denied generally the other allegations thereof.
In their counterclaims, defendants alleged that plaintiffs had failed to pay an installment of $5000.00 that
became due on J a n u a r y 1st, 1952, the interest on the
amount remaining unpaid on the contract and taxes and
insurance premium, the amount of which is not alleged.
Defendants also alleged that plaintiffs had committed waste on the property, had sold some of the personal
propert}^ and that because of such breach of the contract
defendants had been damaged in excess of $8000.00.
Defendants also alleged in their counterclaim that they
rescinded and cancelled the contract set out in plaintiffs'
complaint and retained the down payment of $8000.00 as
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liquidated damages and demanded possession of the
property mentioned in the contract and for $1000.00
attorney's fee.
By the second counterclaim defendants sought to
foreclose a mortgage for the payment of $5000.00 due on
J a n u a r y 2, 1952 and for interest on the money not paid,
for $1000.00 attorney's fee and for insurance premiums
and taxes in an amount not alleged.
In a third counterclaim, defendants sought a judgment against the plaintiffs for various sums of money
for a gas stove, a couch, a water heater, chickens, feed for
livestock and other items in the total amount of $1805.00
together with interest thereon at 6% per annum from
March 15,1951 (Tr. 12 to 19).
Plaintiffs answered the counterclaims of the defendants in which answers plaintiffs attacked as void a number of the provisions of the contract between plaintiffs
and defendants which were set out and relied upon by the
defendants for the relief they sought. Plaintiffs admitted that they sold some of the farming equipment for
which they had no use and that they also sold some calves
and lambs in which defendants had no title or right.
Plaintiffs in their answer to the counterclaim consented
to a rescission of the contract between them and the defendants and consented that the defendants be permitted
to retain sufficient of the down payment of $8000.00 to
pay for any property that may not be returned to the defendants and for the reasonable rental value of the prop-
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erty mentioned in the contract between the parties herein during the time they had the possession thereof.
In their answer to the third counterclaim, the plaintiffs admitted that they agreed to pay defendants $180.00
for a gas stove, a couch and a water heater, but denied
generally the other allegations of the counterclaim (R.
21 to 26).
Before the case came on for trial upon the original
pleadings, the plaintiffs were, by the court, granted leave
to file, and they did file an amended and supplemental
complaint. In such pleading, plaintiffs alleged generally
the same matters that were alleged in their original
pleadings. They further alleged that after the original
pleadings were filed an oral agreement was entered into
whereby the contract between plaintiffs and defendants
was cancelled and rescinded; that the property which
plaintiffs were to receive and were given possession of
under the contract was returned to the defendants, except
the pieces of farming machinery that had been sold bjr
the plaintiffs and that in lieu of such machinery, the
plaintiffs delivered to and there was accepted by the
defendants some hay and sheep.
In the amended and supplemental complaint it is
further alleged that by the oral agreement so entered
into, it was agreed that the defendant, Neal G. Davis,
should retain sufficient of the $8000.00 to reimburse defendant, Neal Gr. Davis, for the rental of the premises
during the time plaintiffs had possession thereof and any
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damages that might have been done to said premises and
personal property while plaintiffs were in possession of
the same, and that plaintiff, Kenneth Rasmus sen, would
get in contact with his attorneys in an attempt to get an
agreement with the defendants as to the amount of the
$8000.00 that was paid down on the contract that should
be retained by the defendants as rental and damages.
I t is further alleged in the amended and supplemental complaint that plaintiffs and defendants iiave
been unable to reach an agreement as to the amount that
should be retained by the defendants and that $2000.00
is ample to reimburse the defendants for the rental of the
real and personal property mentioned in the contract and
for any damages that might have been done to such property during the time the same was in possession of the
plaintiff.
To the amended and supplemental complaint the defendants answered. In their answer, they set up three
defenses:
I n the first defense they allege that the contract
between them and the plaintiffs had been rescinded by
the defendants because of the breach thereof by the plaintiffs and that the $8000.00 was a reasonable compensation
for such breach and that plaintiffs agreed that defendants
should retain the same.
The second and third defenses are in substance the
same as the first (R. 39 to 41).
Plaintiffs replied to the answer of the defendants in
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which reply they deny that they agreed that defendants
were to retain the $8000.00.
I t was upon the issues raised by the amended and
supplemental complaint of the plaintiffs, the answer of
the defendants thereto, and plaintiffs' reply to the answer
that the cause came on for trial (R. 43 to 44).
When the case was called for trial, plaintiffs asked
leave of the court to amend their amended and supplemental complaint in conformity with a copy of such motion theretofore served upon the defendants. By such
proposed amendment plaintiffs sought to charge the
defendants with having, prior to the execution of the
contract between the parties herein, falsely represented
that the heating of the home on the premises described
in the contract between plaintiffs and defendants cost
only a little more than to heat the same with coal while
in fact such costs of heating said house with oil was substantially six times as much as the cost of heating the
same with coal (E. 45).
Defendants' counsel objected to permitting the
amendment to be made. The court took the motion under
advisement (R. 3-4).
The evidence offered and received in this case, particularly the cross-examination of the plaintiffs is quite
lengthy when viewed in light of the limited issues raised
by the pleadings. In view of such fact we shall confine
ourselves in this brief to directing the attention of the
court to only those portions of the evidence which we
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deem necessary to an understanding and a proper determination of the matters wherein appellants claim the
trial court erred in rendering the judgment appealed
from. There is no controversy concerning these facts.
On March 15, 1951 the defendants as sellers and tin
plaintiffs as buyers entered into a written contract whereby the defendants agreed to sell and the plaintiffs agreed
to buy the land, water stock, farming equipment, cattle
and sheep described in the contract, a copy of which is
attached to the original complaint and another copy is
attached to the supplemental complaint and in each
case marked Exhibit A. The contract was received in
evidence as plaintiffs' Exhibit A (E. 6 and 54).
The total price agreed upon for the property was
$32,000.00 of which $8000.00 was paid in cash and the
plaintiffs gave a Chattel Mortgage to defendant, Neal G.
Davis, for the sum of $5000.00 as security for the payment of the installment of $5000.00 which, by the terms
of the contract, became due on January 1, 1952. The
court so found (R. 73).
The contract of sale and purchase contained among
others the following provisions:
"The Buyers may take immediate possession
of said property and they may continue in possession of said property while this contract remains in good standing and until a breach or default by the Buyers, but immediately upon the
happening of any breach or default by the Buyers
or at any time thereafter (without prejudice on
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account of Sellers' failure to act or any action
taken for a previous default) the Sellers shall
have the right to rescind this contract and to
terminate the same and forfeit all of the right
of the Buyers herein in and to said property and
to hold and retain all payments received from the
Buyers and all improvements upon said property
and all replacements of said personal property
and livestock as liquidated damages, (which damages are hereby declared to be the damages the
Sellers shall suffer in the event of such breach
or default) etc." Exhibit A.
It also appears without controversy that plaintiffs
went into possession of the property described in the
contract immediately after its execution and remained
in possession thereof until on or about February 15,1952
when the contract was rescinded and the property described therein returned to the defendants (Tr. 22).
From time to time during their occupancy of the
property described in the contract here involved, the
plaintiffs complained to the defendants about the misrepresentations made by the defendants to the plaintiffs
about the property covered by the contract and particularly about the property being free from weeds,
(Tr. 8-18-94-98-99-152) free from alkali, (Tr. 15-18-8393) its ability to furnish feed for all the milch cows and
sheep (Tr. 13-15-19), the cost of heating the home with oil
(Tr. 139-140-177).
There were a number of conversations and attempts
to settle the controversy between plaintiffs and defend-
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ants prior to the time the contract was rescinded (Tr.
103-106-113-114-121).
During the time plaintiffs were in possession of the
premises which they agreed to purchase, they sold some
of the farm equipment for which they had no use. To
pay for the equipment, plaintiff, Kenneth Rasmussen,
gave defendant, Neal G. Davis, some hay and sheep which
were accepted by Davis in payment for the machinery
sold (Tr. 31-43-108-116). It is in effect so alleged in defendants' answer to the amended and supplemental complaint (R. 40). It was so found by the trial court (R.
72).
As bearing on the reasonable value of the use and
occupancy of the property described in the contract between plaintiffs and defendants during the eleven months
that plaintiffs were in possession of the property, the
evidence shows:
That plaintiff, Kenneth Rasmussen, levelled about
20 acres of the land described in the contract at a cost of
$750.00 of which amount plaintiffs paid $350.00 and the
Federal Government paid $400.00 (Tr. 13). That in
addition to the hay raised on the Davis property, plaintiff
purchased grain to feed the dairy cows in the amount
of $1300.00 (Tr. 20). That he raised about 500 bushels
of wheat (Tr. 11) that there was about 15 tons of hay
raised on the Davis land (Tr. 8) which was only about
one-fifth of the hay fed to the dairy cows that was raised
on the Davis property (Tr. 21); that plaintiffs sold wool
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from the sheep and received therefor about $400.00 (Tr.
32). Plaintiff sold some wild hay for about $60.00 (Tr.
38). Mrs. F a u n Basmussen, one of the plaintiffs, who
handled the money derived from the dairy cows testified
that she had gone over the amount of money that was
received for the milk sold from the dairy cows and that
during five and one-half months they received $2200.00
which was an average of the money received from that
source (Tr. 170). That about two-thirds of the milk produced and sold came from cows that were owned by the
plaintiffs before they entered into the contract with the
defendants. The plaintiff, Kenneth Basmussen, testified
that the usual rental paid for land in Sanpete County is
that the tenant gets one-half of the crop for operating
the land and the land-owner gets the other one-half and
the tenant furnishes the equipment; that the witness did
not know of any custom or practice as to the division
of the profits in operating a dairy.
The plaintiff, Kenneth Basmussen repeatedly testified that it was agreed that the contract should be
rescinded, but that he and defendant, Neal G. Davis,
could not and did not agree upon who should have the
down payment of $8000.00; that it was finally agreed
that the matter should be left to the attorneys for the
respective parties to adjust, if they were able to adjust
the same. (Tr. 25, 42, 100, 112, 113, 114, 117). Mr. Easmussen further testified that he did not think he could
settle the case without the consent of his attorneys.
(Tr. 118),
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During the course of the examination of the plaintiff, Mrs. Rasmussen, the following occurred:
"Q.

Where did you next learn of what, if anything, had been done toward a settlement of
this dispute?

A.

That evening.

Q.

And who did you learn that from?

A.

Kenneth.

Q.

What did he tell you?

A.

He told me that he had given Neal Davis the
sheep, three ton of hay in replacement for
the machinery we sold. That we had straightened that matter up and we were going to
give them possession of the place, but at no
time did I consent—
MR. WOOLLEY: Just a minute, don't go on.
T H E COURT: Don't say anything else.

Q. Was anything said by your husband as to
the matter of the $8000.00 ?
A.

Yes sir.
T H E COURT: In his presence?

T H E COURT: If there is no objection, I will
let her testify, if there is, I won't,
MR. WOOLLEY: We object, She is talking
to her husband. This is a conversation she had
immediately after he returned from talking with
Mr. Davis, on or about the 13th day of February,
1952, when apparently some arrangement had
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been made between Mr. Davis and Mr. Rasmussen.
T H E COURT: Well, she just testified that
her husband told her he had traded the twenty-one
head of sheep and the three tons of hay for the
machinery that he had taken. Now he again has
asked her what else the husband told her. If
you gentlemen want to let it in, it is all right with
me.
MR, WOOLLEY: If I had any idea what her
answer would be, I don't know whether we would
object or not. We think it is incompetent.
T H E COURT: It is clearly hearsay."
185).

(Tr.

In the absence of the jury, counsel for the plaintiff
stated that plaintiff offered to show, if the plaintiff were
permitted to testify, she would testify that her husband
stated to her, at or just prior to the time they moved
out of the Davis home that he had settled the matter
with respect to the property and machinery and had
turned the farm over to them, but the $8000.00 should
be settled by the attorneys or disposed of in further
litigation. To which Mr. Woolley stated: "Let the record
show that counsel for the defendants objects to that
offer." Mrs. Rasmussen further testified that at or prior
to the time that she moved off the Davis property, which
is involved in this action, she did not know or have any
information that the $8000.00 was to be retained by Mr.
Davis. (Tr. 185).
I t will be seen from the pleading of the parties that
there is no controversy about the contract between the
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plaintiffs and defendants having been rescinded. The
plaintiff alleges that the terms of the rescission were
that the disposition to be made of the down payment was
to be left to the attorneys to agree upon, or if they could
not agree, then to be determined by the courts. (E. 31).
On the other hand the defendants allege that by the
terms of the rescission of the contract the defendants
were to retain the down payment of $8000.00. (R. 40).
Such being the principal issue, much of the evidence
brought out by the cross-examination is wholly foreign
to such issue, and we have purposely confined our reference to that portion of the evidence which bears upon
that issue together with such evidence as may shed light
on the reasonable rental value of the property described
in the contract during the time the plaintiffs were in
possession thereof. In light of the fact that the defendants moved for judgment at the conclusion of plaintiffs
evidence and the further fact that such motion was
granted, the value of the use and occupation of the
property described in the contract between plaintiffs and
defendants seems to have been ignored by the trial court.
I t is from the judgment entered by the trial court at
the conclusion of plaintiffs evidence that the plaintiffs
prosecute this appeal.

SPECIFICATION OF POINTS RELIED UPON
FOR A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:
The errors upon which the appellants rely for the
reversal of the judgment appealed from a r e :
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POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE WITNESS FAUN RASMUSSEN,
ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN, TO THE EFFECT
THAT HER HUSBAND, THE OTHER PLAINTIFF, TOLD
HER JUST BEFORE THEY VACATED THE PREMISES
THAT THE ATTORNEYS W E R E TO DETERMINE W H O
SHOULD GET THE $8000.00 AND IF THEY COULD NOT
AGREE, IT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT.
(Tr. 185).

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING NO. ONE WHERE IT FOUND THAT THERE IS NO
QUESTION OF FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION IN THIS
CASE WHICH SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
AND THAT THE CONTRACT MADE BETWEEN THE
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE IS A
VALID ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. (R. 72).

POINT THEEE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING NO. THREE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ONLY
QUESTION INVOLVED IS WHETHER THE DOWN PAYMENT OF $8000.00 MAY PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED AS
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OR WHETHER THE SAME
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BY THIS COURT AND LEFT
TO THE JURY TO DECIDE. (R. 73).

POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
NO. FOUR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FORFEITURE
CLAUSE INVOLVING THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT IS
FAIR AND JUST UNDER THE CONTRACT; THAT PLAINTIFFS TERMINATED SAID CONTRACT OF THEIR OWN
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FREE WILL AND THAT THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT
PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE AND
HEREBY IS FORFEITED BY PLAINTIFFS TO DEFENDANTS AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, WHICH, IN THE
OPINION OF THE COURT, ELIMINATES ANY QUESTION
OF DAMAGES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE JURY. (R.
73).

POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PAY THEIR PART OF THE TAXES
ON THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE CONTRACT
AND FAILED TO PAY THE FIRE INSURANCE PREMIUM
UPON THE PROPERTY.

POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING NO. SIX WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE PARTIES
HAVE DISCHARGED AND TERMINATED ALL THEIR
RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION.

POINT SEVEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ACTION
SHOULD BE DISMISSED AND DEFENDANTS SHOULD
BE AWARDED THEIR COSTS.

POINT EIGHT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
THAT THE ACTION BE DISMISSED AND THAT DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFFS.

ABGUMENT
This is an action at law. When it was commenced
the action was for fraud. Thereafter the parties entered
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into an agreement whereby the contract was rescinded.
In their amended and supplemental complaint, plaintiffs
alleged that by the terms of the rescission, the attorneys
for the parties were to agree upon the division of the
$8000.00 and if they were unable to agree, the same
should be determined by the court. The defendants
alleged that by the terms of the rescission the defendants
were to retain the down payment of $8000.00. I t is, of
course, elementary that, in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, a rescission carries with it the obligation
of each of the parties to restore to the other that which
has been received. 12 Am. J u r . page 1031, Sec. 451
where it is said:
"The very idea of rescinding a contract implies that what has been parted with shall be
restored on both sides. Releasing one party from
his p a r t of the agreement and excusing him from
making the other party whole does not seem
agreeable to reason or justice. Hence the general rule is that a party who wishes to rescind
an agreement must place the opposite party in
status quo. An attempted restoration of the
status quo is an essential part of rescission of a
contract."
Numerous cases from state and federal courts are
collected in foot notes to the text. The law in such particular is so well settled that we refrain from a further
discussion thereof. Under plaintiffs pleading and evidence the question to be determined i s : What was the
amount that plaintiffs were to pay for the use and
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occupancy of the property described in the contract
between the plaintiffs and defendants? That was a
question for the jury.
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE WITNESS FAUN RASMUSSEN,
ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN, TO THE EFFECT
THAT HER HUSBAND, THE OTHER PLAINTIFF, TOLD
HER JUST BEFORE THEY VACATED THE PREMISES
THAT THE ATTORNEYS W E R E TO DETERMINE W H O
SHOULD GET THE $8000 00 AND IF THEY COULD NOT
AGREE, IT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT.
(Tr. 185).

Before the contract between the plaintiffs and defendants could be rescinded by agreement of the parties
it was necessary that both of the plaintiffs agree to
such rescission. Since married women were emancipated,
they have the same right to enter into a contract as do
their husbands and their rights are entitled to the same
protection as their husband's. Indeed under the evidence in this case it was Mrs. Easmussen who was
required to carry the principal burden of carrying out
the contract. During the winter season, Mr. Easmussen
was away from home and Mrs. Easmussen had charge
of operating the dairy that was conducted on the farm.
(Tr. 22). So far as appears, Mrs. Easmussen did not
agree to release any interest the plaintiffs had in the
down payment of $8000.00. By their counterclaim the
defendants sought a rescission of the contract, which if
granted, would entitle the Easmussens to such portion
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of the $8000.00 down payment as remained after the
defendants were made whole. So far as appears Mrs.
Easmussen never authorized her husband to release her
right in the down payment of $8000.00. In this case
much of the business connected with entering into the
contract for the purchase of the property therein mentioned was conducted by Mr. Easmussen. Such fact may,
in a measure, tend to show that Mrs. Easmussen is
bound by what he did, unless she timely made objection
to what he did. It was to rebut any such claim that we \
offered to show what Mr. Easmussen told his wife about
what was to be done with the $8000.00 just before the :
Easmussens vacated the property they were buying from
the Davises.
There are a number of well recognized exceptions
to the rule excluding hearsay evidence. Among such
exceptions it is thus stated in 31 C.J.S., page 988, Sec,
239:
"Where the fact that a particular statement
was made is of itself a relevant fact regardless
of the truth or falsity of such statement, the
statement is admissible in evidence as an independently relevant fact."
The doctrine so announced is the holding of this
court in the case of Parry v. Harris, 93 Utah 317; 72 Pac.
(2d) 1044. Applying such doctrine to the case in hand,
it is of the utmost importance to know the circumstances
under which Mrs. Easmussen consented to move from
the Davis property. If she left the property because
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she was told that part of the down payment of $8000.00
was to be repaid to her and her husband, that is one
thing. If she had reason to believe and did believe that
she was giving up all claim to the down payment of
$8000.00, it is quite another.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING NO. ONE WHERE IT FOUND THAT THERE IS NO
QUESTION OF FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION IN THIS
CASE WHICH SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
AND THAT THE CONTRACT MADE BETWEEN THE
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE IS A
VALID ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. (R. 72).

To call the foregoing language a finding may well
be a misnomer. It can more properly be called a Conclusion of Law. If it is meant by the first p a r t of the
foregoing finding that it is not of controlling importance
whether fraud was or was not perpetrated by the defendants upon the plaintiffs in the course of the negotiations which resulted in the execution of the contract,
we have no quarrel with such a statement. In light of
the fact that the contract was rescinded so far as the
defendants and plaintiff, Kenneth Easmussen, are concerned, the results would probably be the same, that is
to say, a valid rescission could be had whether fraud or
misrepresentation was or was not perpetrated. That
was the reason that plaintiffs made no attempt to fully
develop the elements that are necessary to constitute
actionable fraud. If it is meant by such so-called finding
that no fraud or misrepresentation was shown, then
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we cannot agree with such finding. The evidence to
which we have heretofore directed the attention of the
court shows fraud and misrepresentation although no
attempt was made to show the extent of the damage
sustained by the plaintiffs because when a contract is
rescinded the matter of damages is no longer a proper
subject matter of inquiry as the rights of the parties
are, when a rescission is had, to be placed in status quo.
We shall defer our discussion of the legal effect of the
contract until we take up the Fourth Point where the
same question is raised.
POINT THEEE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING NO. THREE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ONLY
QUESTION INVOLVED IS WHETHER THE DOWN PAYMENT OF $8000.00 MAY PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED AS
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OR WHETHER THE SAME
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BY THIS COURT AND LEFT
TO THE JURY TO DECIDE. (R. 73).

We have not and do not now contend that the question of the rescission of the contract should be left to
the jury. As we understand the law the question of ^
whether a contract should or should not be rescinded is
an equitable matter. If, as the pleadings and the evidence which was received at the trial show, the contract
was rescinded, then there is no occasion for either the
court or the jury to pass upon the question of a rescission. However, in this case, the controversy, so far as
we can ascertain from the pleadings, is not whether there
was a rescission, but what were the terms thereof. When,
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as here, the parties are agreed that a rescission was had,
but they are apparently not agreed as to the terms of
the oral agreement, it would seem clearly to be the
province of the jury to determine what were the terms
thereof the same as it is the province of the jury to find
facts that are in dispute in other oral agreements.
POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL GOURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
NO. FOUR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FORFEITURE
CLAUSE INVOLVING THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT IS
FAIR AND JUST UNDER THE CONTRACT; THAT PLAINTIFFS TERMINATED SAID CONTRACT OF THEIR OWN
FREE WILL AND THAT THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT
PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE AND
HEREBY IS FORFEITED BY PLAINTIFFS TO DEFENDANTS AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, WHICH, IN THE
OPINION OF THE COURT, ELIMINATES ANY QUESTION
OF DAMAGES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE JURY. (R.
73).

It will be seen that the so-called finding which is
attacked by Point Four is in part a finding of facts,
in part a conclusion of law, in part a judgment and in
part a* mere expression of the opinion of the court.
Both the plaintiffs and defendants by their pleadings
allege that the contract was rescinded. They differ only
as to the terms of the rescission. If the plaintiffs' allegations about the terms of the rescission had been established by the evidence, that is one thing, and if the allegations of the defendants as to the terms of the rescission had been established by any evidence, which it was
not, that is quite another.
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Apparently the so-called finding numbered four
above quoted was intended to put the stamp of approval
on the contract here involved. Even if the provisions
of that contract dealing with the matter of forfeiture
were held to be valid contrary to our contention, that
would not solve the controversy between the parties to
this action.
In this case the evidence shows that Mrs. Rasmussen
was never informed of the claim made by the defendants
that the down payment of $8000.00 was to be forfeited
at or prior to the time the Rasmussens vacated the Davis
property. If the purpose of finding No. 4 is intended
to preclude her from recovering back a p a r t of the
$8000.00 down payment because the defendants had a
right to and did declare a forfeiture of the $8000.00,
then we take issue with such a claim. I t will be noted that
by the terms of the contract the defendants may declare
a forfeiture not only of the $8000.00 down payment, but
also of the $5000.00 note secured by a mortgage on cows
belonging to the plaintiff if plaintiffs were guilty of any
breach. The provisions of paragraph 6 of the contract
is about as all embracing and harsh as can be drawn,
except possibly under its provisions the plaintiff's could
not be deprived of the custody of their children, if they
breached the contract.
I t will be seen that not only did the defendants
receive the $8000.00 down payment, but they also received
a $5000.00 note and mortgage. Thus they had a down
payment equivalent to $13,000.00 which, under the terms
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of the contract, they could retain if the plaintiffs breached their contract in any particular such as a failure
to pay the premium on a fire insurance policy or the
taxes. Even the defendants seem to have had the
semblance of a conscience when they concluded that it
would be asking for too much to not only retain the
down payment of $8000.00, but also the $5000.00 note
and mortgage. If as we contend the provision of the
contract dealing with forfeiture was invalid when executed, its invalidity could not be cured by the defendants
foregoing an attempt to retain all that the contract provided might be retained. In light of the recent decision
of this court in the case of Perkins et al. v. Spencer et al.,
243 Pac. 446 (not yet in Utah Eeports) and the other
cases from this jurisdiction there cited, we shall not
cite other cases or authorities. As we read that case the
provisions therein contained dealing with a forfeiture
are indeed mild as compared with the provisions touching a forfeiture in this case.
POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PAY THEIR PART OF THE TAXES
ON THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE CONTRACT
AND FAILED TO PAY THE FIRE INSURANCE PREMIUM
UPON THE PROPERTY.
All that need be said about this finding is that
nowhere does it appear what part of the taxes the
plaintiffs were to pay or the amount of taxes, or that
plaintiffs refused to pay the same, and the record is
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absolutely devoid of any evidence as to fire insurance
premiums.
POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING NO. SIX WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE PARTIES
HAVE DISCHARGED AND TERMINATED ALL THEIR
RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION.

Such finding No. 6 is not only without support in the
evidence, but it is contrary to the uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff, Kenneth Easmussen, to which we have
heretofore referred in which he repeatedly testified that
he did not agree that the defendants should retain the
down payment of $8000.00.
POINT SEVEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ACTION
SHOULD BE DISMISSED AND DEFENDANTS SHOULD
BE AWARDED THEIR COSTS.

The matters we have heretofore discussed apply to
Point Seven, and we shall not enlarge upon what is
there said.
POINT EIGHT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
THAT THE ACTION BE DISMISSED AND THAT DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFFS.

If the court erred in the particulars heretofore discussed, it follows that the plaintiffs are entitled to prevail on this assigned error. The trial court not only
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invaded the province of the jury in taking this case
from it, but likewise erred in the particulars heretofore
discussed.
It is submitted that the judgment should be reversed
and the cause remanded to the court below for trial with
a jury, and that appellants should be awarded their
costs.
Kespectfully submitted,
DON MACK DALTON
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants
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